The importance of data security throughout the supply chain is something we have all considered, but Greg Schaffer, acting deputy undersecretary of the (US) Homeland Security Department of the National Protection and Programs directorate at the Department of Homeland Security, recently acknowledged finding instances where vulnerabilities and backdoors have been deliberately placed into hardware and software.
This is not a risk that hasn’t been previously pondered as, in 1995, we watched Sandra Bullock star in ‘The Net," and address this very issue. However the startling realism of Mr Schaffer’s admission means that we it can no longer be categorised as a ‘hollywood hacking’ or a future risk.
The potential impact of such backdoors here is terrifying and it is easy to imagine crucial response systems being remotely disabled at critical points in the name of financial or political advantage.
If we are dedicated to the security of our data, we must consider how to transform our ‘due diligence’ process for any new product or service. How much trust can we put in any technology solution where many of the components originate from lowest cost providers situated in territories recognised to have an interest in overseas corporate secrets?
We stand a chance of finding a keylogger when it’s inserted as malware, but if it’s built into the chipset on your laptop, that’s an entirely different challenge
Do we, as a security community, react to this and change our behavior now? Or do we wait until the risk becomes more apparent and widely documented? Even then, how do we counter this threat without blowing our whole annual budget on penetration testing for every tiny component and sub-routine? Where is the pragmatic line here?
Your response to this threat will depend on many aspects, including the sensitivity of data that you hold, the volume of such data, and the requirement to distribute and share this information. As an immediate step, we should apply pressure to the vendors presenting new products to our organisation — how can they reassure us that every hardware/software component is ‘secure’?
What testing do they conduct? What level of scrutiny and control do they apply to their supply chain, and where is that control handed over to others?
I’m not confident that they will have great answers right now, but if we delay further, we risk building our secure castles on beds of sand.
What do you think? Is this a government-only issue? How should organisations respond?
Posted by Andrew Rose